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GROWTH OF GERMAN DAIRY FARMS UNDER THE EU MILK QUOTA 
 
Abstract 
We estimate determinants of growth among German dairy farms between 1997 und 2005 
under the EU milk quota system. Higher milk yield per cow, more family labour, and higher 
milk prices increase the growth rate of growing farms, ceteris paribus. Older growing farmers 
tend to grow at lower rates. In line with Weiss’ findings (1999) for Austrian farms, Gibrat’s 
Law  of  relative  firm  growth  being  independent  of  initial  firm  size  does  not  hold  for  our 
subsample of farms growing in milk production, either: the growth rate is quite high for small 
farms and has a minimum for farms around 325,000 kg of initial quota. For the 16% of 
growing  farms  that  have  more  initial  quota  the  growth  rate  increases  up  to  some  out-of-
sample maximum. We corrected for selection bias by means of a multinomial logit model 
which  explains  the  choice  among  different  growth  regimes  in  more  detail  than  the  well-
known Heckman procedure. In our case, e.g. age impacts the choice between growth and 
stagnation but not between growth and exiting from milk production; crop subsidies only 
influence the decision between growth and exiting from milk production but not the decision 
between growth and decline or stagnation.  
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1.  Introduction 
Growth  of  farms  is  one  key  aspect  of  change  in  farm  structure.  Unfortunately,  empirical 
findings of farm growth are rather limited. This is particularly true and unfortunate for EU 
dairy farming. On one hand, rapid structural change in the farm dairy sector is expected to 
occur when the supply control – the ‘milk quota’ – will be abolished in 2014. On the other 
hand, we are not aware of any empirical study about growth of milk farms in the EU, in 
particular, nor under a quota system, in general.  
We study determinants of growth among German dairy farms between 1997 und 2005 to give 
some first empirical findings on growth determinants for dairy farms under milk quota. We 
distinguish  between  four  different  growth  regimes  –  growth,  stagnation,  decline,  and  exit 3 
 
from  milk  production  –  to  account  for  selection  bias  in  the  estimation  of  growth  rate 
determinants.  
The paper is structured as follows: we first review the literature about empirical farm growth 
analyses  before  giving  some  background  of  the  EU  milk  quota  system  and  German 
particularities  in  quota  transfer  rules  among  farms.  Data  presentation  and  some  detailed 
description of the estimation procedure follow. Results and conclusion finish the paper. 
 
2.  Literature  
The most extreme choice about farm size can be seen between the alternatives of exiting from 
farming or staying in farm business. A bulk of empirical and theoretical literature is dedicated 
to this choice between two discrete alternatives: farm exit or continuation (e.g. Barkley, 1990 
Kimhi, 2000; Weiss, 1999). In addition to exit Foltz’ theoretical model (2004) distinguishes 
among three regimes of continuation: net investment (growth), disinvestment (decline), and 
hysteresis. Within the growth and the decline regime the farmer can choose his farm size from 
a continuous size measure (number of cows) while exit equals a size of zero and hysteresis 
implies  an  unchanged  farm  size.  Foltz  (2004)  assumes  a  farmer  choosing  farm  size,  i.e. 
choosing among the four regimes and the level of growth, according to expected utility. Foltz’ 
farmer is faced with uncertain product prices, he takes into account the (partial) irreversibility 
of investments and he can choose about farm size several times within his planning horizon. 
While Foltz’ empirical analysis is about milk farms in Connecticut Hinrichs et al. (2008) 
study investment, disinvestment and inactivity in hog fattening of German farms. In general, 
Hinrichs et al. (2008)  assume an environment for the farmer similar to Foltz. However, they 
are  only  interested  in  the  discrete  choice  among  the  regimes.  In  contrast  to  Foltz,  they 
measure size change in number of livestock and capital stock. 
Following the analyses of Foltz (2004), Odening et al. (2005), Hinrichs et al. (2008), and 
Weiss  (1999)  hysteresis,  growth  and  exit  are  the  most  relevant  regimes  of  farms.  Partial 
decline  is  rather  unusual  in  livestock  because  costs  for  stable  are  mainly  sunk  costs  and 
because marginal costs of production – in general – do not increase substantially up to the 
stable’s full capacity and average production costs may even decrease.  
Unfortunately the following section about the milk quota system in Germany will show that - 
in a milk quota environment - size changes might not be modeled appropriately based on 
investment models such as Foltz (2004) or Hinrichs et al. (2008). 4 
 
 
3.  Background and Economic framework 
The policy instrument of milk quota had been introduced in the EU in 1984  to restrict milk 
production under price support. In general, farmers were allowed to produce only the amount 
of milk they had quota for. In Germany, farmers received milk quota in 1984 based on their 
historical production figures. Farmers, then, were allowed to sell or lease their quota to other 
farmers. Quota transfer was restricted through several measures, such as the connection of 
quota to land needed for milk production. Although this restriction was abolished after some 
years  quota  transfers  are  still  restricted  to  happen  only  between  farmers  within  the  same 
region that – in general – covers a federal state. In 2000 a remarkable change occurred: quota 
was only allowed to be sold on an exchange platform three times a year. New lease contracts 
were not allowed anymore. Besides renewal of old contracts, purchasing quota is the main 
possibility to expand a dairy farmer’s milk quota endowment now. Until 2007 the trades were 
still  allowed  to  happen  only  within  specified  regions  such  that  the  spatial  distribution  of 
German milk production did not change considerably. 
The characteristics of the German quota systems imply two important conceptual issues for an 
analysis of size changes of the dairy branch of German farms between 1997 and 2005. These 
interrelated questions are: how should we measure size of the dairy branch? And, how can we 
conceptualize the size changes of a farm’s dairy branch under a milk quota system? 
In the literature Foltz (2004) measures the size of specialized dairy farms in number of cows 
while Weiss (1999) used livestock units. Unfortunately, number of cows is not necessarily an 
appropriate size change indicator in a milk quota environment. The quota restriction implies 
(short-run) cost-minimizing behaviour of farmers. In this framework the number of cows may 
change between two years because e.g. the relative price between forage and concentrated 
feed changes. This change, however, is not related to any change in milk production quantity. 
We, thus, prefer a farm’s quota endowment instead, including both owned and leased quota.  
Obviously, leased quota does not fit into an investment model accounting for sunk cost such 
as  Foltz  (2004)  or  Hinrichs  et  al.  (2008).  Both  allow  for  different  regimes  of  farm  size 
change: e.g. net investment, disinvestment, exiting, and hysteresis. On one hand, our farm size 
model  must  incorporate  sunk  costs  (and  uncertain  profits)  because  investment  in  dairy 
production may require investment in special buildings and specific milking equipment. So 
our model must allow for investment decisions in line with Foltz (2004). On the other hand, 5 
 
our model must allow for size changes that follow from changes of leased quota amount. But 
these size changes are neither disinvestment nor investment with sunk costs. Consequently, 
the terms “investment”, “hysteresis”, and “disinvestment” seem too narrow within a milk 
quota environment. We, thus, refer to “growth”, “stagnation”, “decline”, and “exit” instead. 
We interpret farm size change as a discrete choice among these regime alternatives. This is in 
line with Foltz (2004) and Hinrichs et al. (2008). However, the alternatives’ valuation should 
be more general than comparing costs of (dis)investment and return on (dis)investment. This 
comes at a cost: our conceptual framework gives only a broad overview over the decisions we 
want to measure empirically. We cannot gain deep analytical insights from this framework 
about farmers’ growth decisions. 
We simply assume that farmer i chooses regime k at time t0 if the expected utility of regime k 
Vk
* is maximum among M alternative regimes. The expected utility in each regime j ∈ {1, 2, 
… M} is a latent variable Vj
* determined by some exogenous variables zi with regime-specific 
marginal impact γj and an unobservable error ηj: 
( 1)    { }
* * * * *
1 2             with  max ,  ,...  ij i j ij ik i i iM V z V V V V γ η = + =  
The regimes include “growth”, “stagnation”, “decline”, and “exit from milk production”. The 
regimes are determined by the relative size change (St0 – ST) / St0 between t0 and T in a farm’s 
milk branch. Size S is measured in milk quota endowment. For the decision at t0 we assume 
that ST is planned by the farmer and, thus, he plans to belong to one of the regimes which we 
can  observe  through  ST.  If  ST = 0  the  farmer  has  chosen  “exit  from  milk  production”,  if 
St0 = ST he has chosen “stagnation”. In these regimes, there is no variation of the sample 
farms’  relative  size  changes.  So  we  can  analyse  size  changes  only  in  the  “growth”  and 
“decline” regime. In addition to the determinants of the regime choice we want to estimate the 
determinants for the relative size change in the latter two regimes. 
 
4.  Data 
The descriptive statistics of our farm data separated for the four regimes are given in Table 1. 
All farms had milk quota milk in 1995 until 1997. The regime for each farm was decided 
based on the change of milk quota endowment (own and leased quota) between 1997 and 
2005 (first row). Farms that increased their milk quota are among the “growth” subsample, 
farms that did not change their milk quota endowment are among the “stagnation” subsample, 6 
 
farms that faced a decline of quota endowment are in the “decline” subsample while farms 
that had not any milk quota in 2005 are among the “exit from milk production” subsample. 
Note that the farms in the latter group are still actively farming, but not dairy farming. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The farms cover a wide range of farming reality in Germany. The values are taken from 1997.  
There  are  farms  from  all  over  western  Germany,  though  Bavaria  with  1549,  Baden-
Wuerttemberg (755), Lower-Saxony (739) and North Rhine-Westphalia with 681 farms make 
up for the majority of the 3939 farms in the sample. There are some organic farms and part-
time farms in the sample. Most farms produce on 50 to 60 hectares, while they have between 
30 to 40 cows in 1997. Farms that quit milk production until 2005 are smaller in terms of 
livestock  with  only  24  cows  on  average.  In  terms  of  milk  quota  the  average  size  in  the 
regimes varies between 137,000 kg and 225,000 kg. As one may expect, on average growing 
farms have the highest initial milk quota endowment. Also, the distribution of the growing 
farms’ quota in 1997 exhibits a positive skewness, as shown in Figure 1. Overall there are 
only three farms with more than one million kilograms of quota, a number rising to 24 in 
2005.  
The average farmer is of an age of 45. The milk price obtained is around 0.34 € per kilogram 
of milk. Other variables include values of buildings, debt and interest payments as well as 
family labour. These variables may capture some determinants for investment such as sunk 
costs and financial soundness of a farm. Management performance is proxied by milk yield 
per cow and numbers of calves per cow.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
5.  Estimation  
We borrow the description of the estimation model from Bourguignon et al. (2007) and apply 
it to the farmer’s choice problem on changes of farm size S introduced above. The choice is 
between different regimes, e.g. growth, stagnation, shrinking, exit from milk production. In 
the regimes growth and shrinking the farmer can also choose among different relative size 7 
 
changes.  The  changes  in  these  regimes  are  different  from  zero  and  different  from  minus 
100%, of course. The change rate G in regime k for farmer i is given by: 
( 2)  ( ) ( ) 0 ln ln   ik i iT ik ik G S S x u β = − = +  
Determinants  of  the  change  rate  are  represented  by  a  vector  of  variables  xi,  β  is  to  be 
estimated and ui is the error term. However, the change rate in regime k can be only observed 
if k is chosen accordingly to ( 1).  
Of course, for identification purposes variables x and z must not be completely identical. If we 
now set  
( 3)      { } { }
* * max   max   k ij ik i j ij i k ik j k j k V V z z ε γ η γ η
≠ ≠ = − = + − −  
The condition in ( 1) becomes  
( 4)      0 k ε <  
Bourguignon  et  al.  (2007)  proceed  (p.  176):  under  the  assumption  that  the  (ηj)s  are 
independent  and  identically  Gumbel  distributed  (i.e.  under  the  assumption  that  the  IIA 
assumption holds) the (γj)s can be estimated in a multinomial logit model (McFadden, 1973), 
whereas Pj is the probability that regime j is chosen, i.e. that the expected utility of j is 
maximum among the M regimes: 
( 5)  ( ) { } ( )
( )
( )
* * * *




k k k ik i i iM z
j
e
P z P V V V V z
e
γ
γ ε < = = =
∑
 
The  problem  lies  in  estimating  β  from  (  2)  because  the  error  u  from  (  2)  might  not  be 
independent from all (ηj)s in ( 1). If there are only two regimes, i.e. M = 2, Heckman (1979) 
has proposed a solution for this selection bias: the expectation of the error u is some function 
of  zγ1  and  zγ2.  In  fact,  the  inverse  Mill’s  Ratio  times  its  estimation  coefficient  is  such  a 
function.  Generalizing  this  idea  to  the  multinomial  logit  gives  some  function  λ  of  all  zγj:
( ) 1 2 , ,... M z z z λ λ γ γ γ =  or an equivalent function   of the probabilities that regime k is chosen  
( 6)  ( ) 1 2 , ,... i i i Mi P P P µ µ =  
Then β can be consistently estimated by including   (or λ) into ( 2).  
( 7)    ik ik i ik G x u β µ = + + . 8 
 
However, for both λ or   an intractable large number of parameters has to be estimated for a 
multinomial logit. Thus, several authors suggest restrictions on λ or  . We follow Dahl (2002) 
who suggests that  (P1,P2,… PM) can be approximated by series expansion and interaction 
terms and the respective parameters to be estimated in ( 7). In other words,   is a linear 
combination  of  the  terms  in  the  series  expansion  and  the  interaction  terms  where  as  the 
weights are parameters to be estimated in ( 7). In our case, we have M = 4 and choose a series 
expansion of grade 3 and get P1, P2, P3, and P4 as linear, quadratic and cubic terms as well as 
interaction terms between two terms of the series expansion. Note that some of these terms 
might be dropped due to multicollinearity in the estimation procedure. 
Based on Monte Carlo simulations Bourguignon et al. (2007) found that Dahl’s approach is 
not dominated by other approaches known from the literature. The authors also found “that 
the selection bias correction based on the multinomial logit model can provide fairly good 
correction for the outcome equation, even when the IIA hypothesis is violated.” (p. 174) 
What are the differences of this estimation approach compared to literature analyses on farm 
size  change?  The  difference  to  studies  estimating  determinants  of  growth  rates  without 
accounting for selection bias is obvious (e.g. Foltz, 2004). However, Weiss (1999) already 
showed  that  such  studies  may  produce  biased  estimates.  When  estimating  growth  he 
accounted for self-selection between staying in business and exiting from farming. Compared 
to Weiss (1999) ( 7) accounts for more than two regimes. ( 6) allows for many variables to be 
included  in  the  growth  rate  equation  and  parameters  to  be  estimated  while  the  Heckman 
procedure in Weiss (1999) includes the inverse Mill’s ratio only. Thus, our approach may 
account for a more complex selection bias. 
Hinrichs et al. (2008) estimate the determinants for a farmer investing, disinvesting or not 
changing hog fattening production capacity. This approach is quite similar to ours in that 
more than two regimes are accounted for. However, authors do not estimate change rates but 
regime choice only. They account for the ordering of the latent variable among regimes in the 
estimation of regime choice. This is appropriate in their setting since the latent variable that 
determines the farmer’s regime choice is expected (marginal) return of capital. If the farmer 
actually  invests  the  expected  return  of  capital  is  highest  for  the  investment  alternative 
(because capital costs are higher for investment than for inactivity or disinvestment). If the 
farmer does not invest his marginal return of capital is assumed to be smaller than his capital 
costs for investment. If he disinvests his returns to capital are assumed to be smaller than in 
case of unchanged production capacity. The reasons are sunk costs that cause low returns to 9 
 
capital in case of reducing production capacity because of small salvage values. In our setting, 
the size change is not only determined by return of capital because e.g. quota lease contracts 
may simply expire. Thus, we do not assume an ordering of our regime alternatives. 
We are mainly interested in estimates of growth determinants and whether these estimates are 
sensitive  to  selection  bias  correction.  Consequently,  we  have  an  OLS  estimation  with  all 
farms in the sample that produced milk in 1997 and 2005, an OLS estimation including only 
farms that have higher milk quota endowment in 2005 than in 1997. Furthermore, we have a 
Heckman estimation with only the growth farms in the second step estimation and a selection 
equation  with  two  regimes:  either  more  milk  quota  endowment  in  2005  than  in  1997  or 
producing  milk  in  1997  and  no  increase  in  milk  quota  endowment  till  2005.  Finally,  we 
followed  the  two  step  approach  of  Dahl  with  again  growing  farms  in  the  second  step 
estimation but accounting for four different regimes in a system selection equation. 
 
6.  Results 
The results are structured into three sections. We, first, compare the estimation results for 
determinants of growth from the different procedures to account for the selection bias. We, 
then,  present  the  selection  equations  for  the  growth  regime  against  the  three  remaining 
regimes and discuss their results. We, finally, study the impact of farm size in more detail to 
test Gibrat’s law for our dataset. 
Table  2  shows  the  OLS  estimates  that  explain  growth  rates  while  Table  3  shows  the 
respective estimates accounting for selection bias. Although all estimations exhibit several 
significant variables there are noticeable differences. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In the first estimation in Table 2 all farms that have milk quota in 1997 and 2005 are included. 
Restricting the sample to growing farms only, i.e. quota endowment in 2005 is higher than in 
1997,  changes  estimates,  of  course.  For  example,  part-time  farming  (third  row)  seems  to 
reduce  growth  in  the  non-exiting  farms  sample  while  part-time  farms  do  not  grow 
significantly differently than other growing farms. 
 10 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
The growth determinants in Table 3 are estimated accounting for sample selection bias. The 
estimates of a Heckman procedure in the growth farms sample – such as Weiss (1999) – differ 
substantially from the OLS estimates of the growth sample in some respects. The correlation 
between  the  error  terms  of  the  selection  equation  and  the  growth  equation  is  highly 
significant. This is in line with some specifications in Weiss’ (1999). However, the impact of 
many variables is similar in the Heckman estimation and in the OLS of the growth sample: 
farms that receive higher milk prices and more subsidies for livestock production (which is 
only slightly correlated to our size measures) and that produce more milk per cow tend to 
grow at a higher rate (among the growing farmers). In addition, farms on worse land and with 
more family labour also tend to grow faster. In contrast, farms with older farm operators tend 
to grow less. However, there are also considerable differences between both estimations: the 
Heckman estimation reveals that farms having a higher share of debt capital or that have more 
land tend to grow significantly slower. The sensitivity of the estimates for the initial size 
measures  –  quota  endowment  and  cows  –  depending  on  the  estimation  approach  can  be 
explained by multicollinearity.  
The more detailed incorporation of terms correcting for selection bias by the Dahl estimation 
reveals only small differences compared to the Heckman-based results. Some variables loose 
significance. The most noticeable difference might be that the marginal impact of milk yield 
per cow is higher by one third in the Dahl procedure. The latter reveals that a farmer with 
1000 kilogram more milk yield per cow in 1997 would have grown 22%-points more than 
other growing farmers, ceteris paribus. Well in line with expectations is that higher interest 
payments and a higher debt share reduces growth while higher subsidies for interest increase 
growth.
1 
Most results are in line with the literature: Farms with higher milk yields per cow grow at a 
higher rate. This is in line with Foltz (2004) and expresses that more productive farmers tend 
to grow faster – also under a milk quota system. Foltz’ (2004) study reveals a positive impact 
of (the previous year’s) milk price on the number of cows on a farm. However, the impact of 
Foltz’ price may follow from price variation over time and not among farms. Foltz’ result 
                                                 
1 To account for endogneity we also used specifications including interest payments, subsidies on interest 
payments, debt share, and accumulated depreciation of buildings with its 1995 values. The above results are 
confirmed by this specification. 11 
 
may show that farmers invest in years after high prices, but it does not necessarily show that 
farmers who receive higher prices invest more. In line with our negative coefficient for age 
Weiss (1999) reveals a negative marginal impact of farm operator’s age on growth for full-
time farmers older than 38. The positive impact of family labour on growth we found also 
seems to be in line with Weiss (1999): he found a positive impact for large farm families and 
for farms already having found a successor within their family. A noticeably difference is that 
we have not any significant impact of part-time farming on the growth rate of growing farms. 
Weiss found a negative impact in a specification including part- and ful-time farmers.  
Table 4 shows, that there is not any significant impact of part-time farming on the selection of 
growth farms, either. Table 4 exhibits the determinants of choosing the growth regime versus 
either stagnation, or shrinking or exiting from milk production. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Several results could be also found in a Heckman selection equation since the parameters do 
not  differ  substantially  among  the  three  selection  equation  of  growth  versus  stagnation, 
shrinking,  or  exit,  respectively.  For  example,  a  higher  milk  yield  per  cow  increases  the 
probability  for  belonging  to  the  growth  sample  against  each  of  the  three  other  regimes. 
However, the multinomial logit reveals some relationships that cannot be obtained by a binary 
choice model. E.g. older farmers tend to stagnate or to reduce milk production instead of 
growing. But age has no impact on the choice between growth in milk production and exiting 
from milk production. Also the level of subsidies received for crop production increases only 
the probability of exiting from milk production relative to growth; it does not impact the 
choice between growth and stagnation or decline. The county unemployment rate impacts the 
regime in three different ways. The choice between growth and exiting is not significantly 
affected.  On  one  hand,  for  higher  unemployment  the  choice  for  growth  becomes  more 
probable than the choice for decline. On the other hand, higher unemployment increases the 
probability for stagnation versus growth.  
However, these detailed insights are not substantial for correcting the selection bias as we can 
see from the high similarity between the growth rate estimations following the Heckman and 
the Dahl procedure. This is also true for the size measures that are jointly highly significant in 12 
 
explaining growth rate. Not only the log of quota endowment but also the ln of number of 
cows influences the growth rate significantly.  
But what can we say about Gibrat’s law of proportionate effects? This law demands that 
relative  firm  size  growth  is  independent  of  initial  firm  size.  Weiss  (1999)  revealed  a 
relationship between the farm size growth rate and the initial farm size that is similar to our 
impact of initial milk quota endowment on the growth of milk quota. In Figure 2 we graph the 
partial relationship between growth rate and initial milk quota for growing farms. In contrast 
to Weiss we have two size measures that are highly correlated to each other – milk quota 
endowment and number of cows. To account for the multicollinearity  between quota and 
number of cows in the growth sample we have also included the correlation between quota 
and number of cows and the impact of number of cows on growth rate. The function in Figure 
2 is based on  
 
( 8) 
( ) ( )
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Figure 2 about here 
 
For 325,000 kilogram of milk quota the growth rate function reveals a local minimum which 
is  nearly  10  percentage  points  smaller  than  for  farms  with  100,000  kg  quota.  A  local 
maximum is around 2.7 million kilogram of quota. Unfortunately, this quota endowment is 
out-of-sample, only two farms have had between one and two million kilogram quota in 1997. 
The  corresponding  growth  rate  is  around  20  percentage  points  higher  than  at  the  local 
minimum and equals the growth rate of small farms with roughly 110,000 kilogram of quota. 
In contrast to Weiss (1999) we restrict our graph to the growing farms only. The high growth 
rate of small farms makes sense in the German quota system of the 1990s: if a small farmer 
has chosen to grow he competes for lease contracts from quota owners. Most owners can be 
assumed to prefer leasing their quota to one farmer. Consequently, a given lease contract 
results in a higher relative growth for small than for large farmers. An analogous reasoning 13 
 
may follow from fixed costs elements in an investment decision. Some minimum absolute 
investment size results in higher relative growth for a farm with a low initial size.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
For the technical aim of the analysis concerning the estimation of growth rate determinants 
we can draw the following conclusions: for our data set accounting for selection bias in the 
group of growing farms is necessary. However, the chosen procedure based on a multinomial 
logit  estimation  which  is  more  complex  and  more  detailed  than  the  common  Heckman 
correction does not reveal significantly different results. Nevertheless, the multinomial logit 
has its own right since it explains the regime choice among different growth regimes more 
differentiated than the Heckman procedure. In our case, e.g. age impacts the choice between 
growth and stagnation but not between growth and exiting from milk production. Another 
example are crop subsidies which only influence the decision between growth and exiting but 
not the decision between growth and decline or stagnation.  
Most  variables  found  to  be  significant  determinants  for  growth  rates  are  in  line  with  the 
literature of growth of livestock production. Higher milk yield per cow, more family labour, 
and  higher  milk  prices  increase  the  growth  rate  of  growing  farms,  ceteris  paribus.  Older 
growing farmers tend to grow at lower rates. Results on testing Gibrat’s Law of firm growth 
confirm results of Weiss (1999) for Austrian farms: The growth rate is quite high for small 
farms and has a minimum for farms around 325,000 kg of initial quota. For the 16% of 
growing  farms  that  have  more  initial  quota  the  growth  rate  increases  up  to  some  out-of-
sample maximum. Consequently, Gibrat’s Law does not hold for our subsample of farms with 
growing milk production between 1997 und 2005 under German milk quota. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
   Regime  Growth     Stagnation     Decline     Exit 
Variable name  Description  Mean  SD     Mean  SD     Mean  SD     Mean  SD 
Change  Ln (Quota in 2005) - Ln (Quota in 1997)  0.38  0.31    0  0    -0.60  0.90    not defined 
Business  Dummy for major farm branch (1 = non-dairy; 0 = dairy)  0.01  0.08    0.03  0.17    0.02  0.13    0.02  0.13 
Organic  Dummy for organic farms (1 = organic; 0 = non-organic)  0.01  0.11    0.02  0.12    0.02  0.13    0.02  0.14 
Part time  Dummy for part time farms (1 = part time; 0 = full time)  0.01  0.10    0.03  0.17    0.04  0.20    0.04  0.19 
Corporate  Dummy for legal status (1 = corporate farm; 0 = else)   0.14  0.35    0.07  0.25    0.10  0.30    0.10  0.30 
Dep. buildings  Depreciation on buildings to total depreciation in %  23.4  11.8    20.7  12.5    23.3  13.4    20.7  12.3 
Profit  Total farm profits in 1,000 €  30.9  24.5    26.2  23.2    23.0  22.3    26.0  27.5 
Revenues  Total revenues in 1,000 €  23.9  18.2    22.7  19.6    20.7  15.9    24.0  22.8 
Debt  Debt to total assets in %  16.9  16.4    16.6  18.5    18.2  20.4    17.6  18.9 
Crop subsidies  Subsidy payments for crops in 1,000 €  7.94  7.17    8.64  7.70    8.12  7.83    9.00  6.33 
Ass. buildings  Assets in buildings to fixed assets in %  17.1  12.7    14.4  11.9    13.6  10.9    13.5  11.8 
Animal subsidies  Subsidy payments for animals in 1,000 €  1.43  2.28    1.44  3.36    0.98  1.66    2.05  5.23 
Dep. share  Accumulated depreciation of buildings relative to purchase cost in %  44.0  16.9    46.8  18.3    49.0  17.4    49.2  19.3 
Interest  Interest paid for debt in 1,000 €  5.65  6.22    4.76  5.98    5.98  7.77    5.90  7.48 
Interest subsidies  subsidy payments on interest in 1,000 €  1.18  2.46    0.52  1.54    0.57  1.51    0.36  1.10 
Other subsidies  Other subsidy payments in 1,000 €  7.44  10.0    6.35  10.8    5.71  6.72    4.45  5.68 
Soil quality  German soil quality index (0 = worst; 100 = best)  32.2  10.7    34.7  11.7    35.0  12.4    34.6  11.5 
Land  Land used in hectare  58.8  32.0    57.0  32.6    52.3  32.1    54.9  30.5 
Grassland  Share of grassland  47.6  25.0    39.8  24.5    40.5  26.9    29.6  19.1 
Rented land  Share of rented land  51.4  27.1    53.5  28.3    47.9  28.2    49.6  28.9 
Education  Agricultural education (1 = “farm master” and higher; 0 = lower)   0.30  0.46    0.23  0.42    0.29  0.45    0.28  0.45 
Family labour  Family workers in full time equivalents  1.70  0.49    1.59  0.46    1.53  0.44    1.59  0.48 
Other labour  Other workers in full time equivalents  0.09  0.29    0.07  0.29    0.06  0.23    0.09  0.24 
Age  Age of the farm operator  44.1  10.1    46.5  10.1    45.6  9.33    45.2  11.0 
Calves  Calves per 100 cows and year  110  23.4    104  28.9    105  25.9    101  31.4 
Cows  Number of cows  42.4  18.0    31.2  17.5    31.9  14.7    24.1  14.9 
Yield  Milk yield in 1000 kg / cow  5.90  1.14    5.39  1.32    5.50  1.13    5.48  1.38 
Quota   Quota 1997  in 1000 kg   225  126    157  93.1    191  243    137  90.2 
Density  Quota per hectare in kg / hectare  4243  2115    3150  1749    4163  3638    2828  1673 
Unemployment  County unemployment rate in %  9.03  2.54    9.65  2.96    8.80  2.18    9.51  2.57 
Restrictions  Share of land under use restrictions in %  1.87  11.8    1.63  11.2    2.17  12.6    1.22  9.55 
Less favoured  Dummy for farms in less favoured areas (1 = less favoured; 0 = not)  0.53  0.50    0.46  0.50    0.47  0.50    0.41  0.49 
Milk price  Milk price in Euro cents / kg  34.0  1.84     34.1  3.67     34.0  2.79     33.8  2.03 
Number of observations  2243    1060    343    293 
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Table 2: Growth rate determinants (OLS without accounting of selection bias) 
Estimation  method     OLS for non-exiting farms     OLS for growing farms 
Observations    3646    2243 
Variable     Parameter     Probability     Parameter     Probability 
Business    -0.112  *    0.08    0.087      0.19 
Organic    -0.093      0.14    -0.072      0.11 
Part time    -0.276  ***    0.00    -0.022      0.68 
Corporate    -0.004      0.86    -0.014      0.34 
Dep. buildings    -0.002  **    0.01    0.000      0.48 
Profit    0.000      0.69    0.000      0.48 
Revenues    0.002  **    0.02    0.001  **    0.01 
Debt    -0.001  *    0.08    0.000      0.93 
Crop subsidies    -0.001      0.54    -0.003  **    0.03 
Ass. buildings    0.001      0.15    0.000      0.97 
Animal subsidies    0.012  ***    0.00    0.010  ***    0.00 
Dep. share    -0.001      0.14    0.000      0.27 
Interest    -0.003  *    0.06    -0.002      0.13 
Interest subsidies    0.008  *    0.05    0.002      0.33 
Other subsidies    0.000      0.77    0.001      0.19 
Soil quality    -0.002  ***    0.00    -0.001  **    0.03 
Land    -0.001  **    0.02    0.000      0.82 
Grassland    0.001  **    0.02    -0.001  **    0.02 
Rented land    0.000      0.64    0.000      0.69 
Education    -0.001      0.97    0.004      0.75 
Family labour    0.067  ***    0.00    0.034  ***    0.00 
Other labour    -0.006      0.83    -0.023      0.25 
Age    -0.002  ***    0.00    -0.002  ***    0.00 
Calves    0.000      0.99    0.000      0.71 
ln Cows    -1.918  ***    0.00    2.753  **    0.01 
(ln Cows) squared    0.770  ***    0.00    -0.511  *    0.08 
(ln Cows) cubic    -0.072  ***    0.00    0.046  *    0.09 
Yield    0.118  ***    0.00    0.148  ***    0.00 
ln Quota    0.250      0.67    -2.678  ***    0.00 
(ln Quota) squared    -0.167      0.17    0.370  **    0.01 
(ln Quota) cubic    0.011      0.20    -0.025  **    0.02 
Density    0.000      0.11    0.000      0.75 
Unemployment    0.004      0.20    0.004  *    0.08 
Restrictions    0.001      0.11    0.000      0.58 
Less favoured    -0.033  *    0.06    -0.018      0.15 
Milk price    0.006  *    0.05    0.010  ***    0.00 
Constant     1.492        0.11     1.196        0.33 
Significance on the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level. 
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Table 3: Growth rate determinants (second step Heckman and Dahl estimations) 
Estimation method     Heckman second step     Dahl second step 
Observations    2243    2243 
Variable     Parameter     Probability     Parameter     Probability 
Business    -0.086      0.20    -0.077      0.66 
Organic    -0.072      0.18    -0.095      0.31 
Part time    -0.047      0.39    -0.091      0.34 
Corporate    0.022      0.25    0.036      0.57 
Dep. buildings    -0.002  **    0.01    -0.003  **    0.02 
Profit    0.000      0.23    -0.001      0.35 
Revenues    0.001      0.10    0.002      0.11 
Debt    -0.001  **    0.04    -0.002  *    0.05 
Crop subsidies    -0.001      0.77    -0.001      0.67 
Ass. buildings    0.002  *    0.05    0.003  *    0.07 
Animal subsidies    0.010  ***    0.00    0.015  ***    0.00 
Dep. share    -0.001      0.22    -0.001      0.15 
Interest    -0.004  **    0.01    -0.006  ***    0.02 
Interest subsidies    0.011  ***    0.00    0.020  ***    0.02 
Other subsidies    0.002  *    0.09    0.002      0.19 
Soil quality    -0.002  ***    0.00    -0.003  *    0.05 
Land    -0.002  ***    0.00    -0.002  *    0.09 
Grassland    0.000      0.41    0.001      0.25 
Rented land    -0.001  *    0.06    -0.001      0.41 
Education    0.005      0.70    -0.007      0.77 
Family labour    0.055  ***    0.00    0.092  **    0.01 
Other labour    -0.022      0.37    -0.028      0.46 
Age    -0.004  ***    0.00    -0.005  **    0.04 
Calves    0.001  **    0.02    0.001      0.20 
ln Cows    1.586      0.14    1.750      0.35 
(ln Cows) squared    0.041      0.90    0.094      0.88 
(ln Cows) cubic    -0.021      0.48    -0.025      0.69 
Yield    0.166  ***    0.00    0.219  ***    0.00 
ln Quota    -0.732      0.31    -1.046      0.45 
(ln Quota) squared    -0.083      0.57    -0.102      0.77 
(ln Quota) cubic    0.010      0.32    0.013      0.65 
Density    0.000      0.12    0.000      0.32 
Unemployment    -0.004      0.14    0.001      0.89 
Restrictions    0.000      0.39    0.000      0.64 
Less favoured    -0.017      0.26    -0.030      0.18 
Milk price    0.013  ***    0.00    0.014  ***    0.02 
Constant     -1.514        0.18     -0.081        1.00 
Parameter estimates of terms used for correcting the selection bias are not reported. 
Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10%(*) level. 
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Table 4: Selection determinants for growth against the choice of other regimes (multinomial logit) 
Odds for   Stagnation     Decline     Exit 
Variable  Parameter  Prob.     Parameter  Prob.     Parameter  Prob. 
Business  3.145  ***  0.00    2.564  *  0.08    1.255    0.70 
Organic  0.802    0.53    1.440    0.46    2.514  *  0.09 
Part time  1.083    0.80    1.789    0.12    1.019    0.97 
Corporate  0.558  ***  0.00    0.907    0.64    1.082    0.74 
Dep. buildings  1.005    0.26    1.022  ***  0.00    1.011    0.11 
Profit  1.002    0.45    0.999    0.88    1.007  **  0.04 
Revenues  0.996    0.33    0.991    0.12    0.999    0.85 
Debt  1.008  **  0.03    1.016  ***  0.00    1.009    0.11 
Crop subsidies  0.997    0.79    1.003    0.88    0.957  **  0.02 
Ass. buildings  0.991  *  0.09    0.977  **  0.01    0.993    0.43 
Animal subsidies  0.991    0.60    0.902  **  0.01    0.998    0.94 
Dep. share  1.000    0.97    1.004    0.34    1.007    0.12 
Interest  0.995    0.61    0.975  *  0.07    0.947  ***  0.00 
Interest subsidies  0.925  **  0.01    0.906  **  0.03    0.840  **  0.01 
Other subsidies  1.001    0.87    1.002    0.86    0.949  ***  0.00 
Soil quality  1.012  **  0.01    1.015  **  0.02    0.996    0.62 
Land  1.008  **  0.02    1.015  **  0.01    1.014  **  0.02 
Grassland  0.997    0.26    0.992  **  0.03    0.978  ***  0.00 
Rented land  1.006  ***  0.00    1.002    0.46    1.004    0.18 
Education  0.894    0.26    1.201    0.20    1.102    0.55 
Family labour  0.804  **  0.03    0.524  ***  0.00    1.072    0.67 
Other labour  1.234    0.24    0.787    0.42    1.032    0.91 
Age  1.019  ***  0.00    1.018  ***  0.01    1.002    0.76 
Calves  0.995  **  0.01    0.996    0.13    0.992  ***  0.00 
ln Cows  40.46    0.38    106.4    0.35    7.895    0.64 
(ln Cows) squared  0.044  **  0.02    0.067  *  0.09    0.124    0.14 
(ln Cows) cubic  1.543  ***  0.00    1.289    0.14    1.237    0.17 
Yield  0.672  ***  0.00    0.535  ***  0.00    0.680  ***  0.00 
ln Quota  0.003    0.27    0.001    0.22    1.597    0.93 
(ln Quota) squared  9.216  **  0.04    9.821  *  0.08    1.278    0.84 
(ln Quota) cubic  0.811  **  0.01    0.849  *  0.08    0.989    0.90 
Density  1.000    0.93    1.000  **  0.03    1.000    0.53 
Unemployment  1.091  ***  0.00    0.944  *  0.06    0.999    0.98 
Restrictions  0.998    0.65    1.002    0.73    0.998    0.80 
Less favoured  0.941    0.56    1.204    0.23    1.065    0.72 
Milk price  1.003     0.86     0.952     0.13     0.936  **  0.03 
Significance on the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) level. 
Parameters smaller than one indicate that a higher value of the respective variable increases 
the probability to belong to the growth regime. 











































































1000 kg Quota 1997 (logarithmic scale)
Growth
Note that the location of the 
growth is arbitrary. Only the 
differences of the growth rate are 
determined with respect to milk 
quota. 